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Justice Ginsburg's Footnotes 
 
 




 I don't think I will be giving away any state secrets if I reveal that one of the most 
memorable tasks I performed during my clerkship with Justice Ginsburg in the 1998-1999 
term of the Supreme Court involved working on an opera-based footnote skirmish that 
broke out between her and Justice Scalia during the penning of an opinion in the Fourth 
Amendment case of Minnesota v. Carter.1  That case raised the question of whether the Fourth 
Amendment protects people who are social guests in someone else's house from 
unreasonable searches there.  Defendants Carter and Johns had been in Thompson's house 
for a total of 2 ½ hours when a police officer, acting on a tip from an informant, peered 
through a gap in some closed window blinds and observed Carter and Johns bagging 
cocaine.  Searches of the defendants' car and the apartment turned up forty-seven grams of 
coke.  The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the officer had violated Carter and Johns' 
Fourth Amendment rights by peering through Thompson's window without a warrant, and 
it reversed their convictions.2   
 The U.S. Supreme Court took the case and reinstated the convictions.3  In an 
opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that the two defendants did not 
have legitimate expectations of privacy in Thompson's house, distinguishing the facts from 
those in Minnesota v. Olson, in which the Court had held that overnight guests in someone 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.  I would like to thank Mark Dahl for tremendous 
research assistance that was essential to the preparation of this article. 
1 525 U.S. 98 (1998). 
2 Id. at 471-72. 
3 Id. at 472. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1354737
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else's house do have such expectations.4  Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence,5 and Justice 
Ginsburg wrote a dissent.6  It's been ten years,7 so I'm not sure I can recreate the sequence 
of events entirely, but the footnote skirmish broke out sort of like this.  First, Justice 
Ginsburg circulated a dissent in which she claimed that United States v. Katz,8 which had held 
that the government violated a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by surreptitiously 
recording his conversations on a public telephone and which stated that "the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places,"9 was "key to [her] view of the case."10  Justice 
Scalia then drafted a concurrence in which he argued that the text of the amendment pretty 
much protects people only when they are in their own houses; in the midst of this, he 
criticized Justice Ginsburg's reliance on the Katz test, which Justice Scalia noted "has come 
to mean the test enunciated by Justice Harlan's separate concurrence."11  
 It was at this point, I believe, when the action moved to the footnotes.  Justice 
Ginsburg drafted a note addressing what she called "Justice Scalia's lively concurring 
opinion."12  She argued that "[i]n suggesting that we have elevated Justice Harlan's 
concurring opinion in Katz to first place . . . Justice Scalia undervalues the clear opinion of 
the Court that 'the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.' . . . That core 
understanding is the leitmotif of Justice Harlan's concurring opinion.  One cannot avoid a 
strong sense of déjà vu on reading Justice Scalia's elaboration.  It so vividly recalls the opinion 
of Justice Black in dissent in Black."13  This reference to leitmotifs was impossible for Justice 
                                                 
4 Id. at 471-74. 
5 Id. at 474-78. 
6 Id. at 481-84. 
7 Dear lord, I feel old. 
8 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
9 Id. at 351. 
10 Carter, 525 U.S. at 483. 
11 Id. at 477. 
12 Id. at 483 n.2. 
13 Id. 
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Scalia to ignore.  Both Scalia and Ginsburg are opera fans—Scalia, for instance, always goes 
with clerks to a pizza place in the District where opera is played on the jukebox—and they 
are also good friends, so it is not surprising that Scalia picked up on the reference to take 
some light-hearted stabs at the dissent.  In his own footnote responding to Justice 
Ginsburg's footnote, Justice Scalia wrote:  
That the Fourth Amendment does not protect places is simply unresponsive 
to the question whether the Fourth Amendment protects people in other 
people's homes.  In saying this, I do not, as the dissent claims, clash with "the 
leitmotif" of Justice Harlan's concurring opinion" in Katz . . . ; au contraire (or, 
to be more Wagnerian, im Gegenteil), in this regard I am entirely in harmony 
with that opinion, and it is the dissent that sings from another opera.14 
 
 I think I was in the study of my tiny, rat-infested apartment two blocks from the 
Court when Justice Ginsburg first told me about Justice Scalia's footnote while we were on 
the phone talking about some last minute details in the opinion.  If I remember right, she 
seemed to be quite amused by the opera references, and while I might just be totally making 
this up, I think there was at least a little talk about perhaps firing back a couple of opera-
based retorts in Scalia's direction.  Whether or not this possibility was ever in fact raised 
outside of my own head, no further opera references were ever made, and the footnote 
skirmish came to an end as quickly as it had started. 
  
 At first glance (and, admittedly, at second and maybe even third glances), footnotes 
may seem like dull things to discuss, but think about them just a little harder and perhaps 
you'll come to agree with me that they are actually pretty interesting.  To an expert, for 
example, even the most straightforward kind of footnote—one that simply cites one or more 
sources to support a proposition in the text—can turn out to be remarkable for what it cites, 
or more intriguingly, what it fails to cite.  But when the footnotes go beyond mere citation to 
                                                 
14 Id. at 477 n.3. 
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extend an argument or respond to an argument or to engage in some attenuated speculation 
about a related point or make a joke, they can become downright entertaining, even 
fascinating.  Footnotes allow the writer to break away from the main text, to use a different 
tone, to consider tangents—basically to carry on two conversations with the reader at once, 
or at least one-and-a-half.  No wonder that writers throughout the ages have used footnotes 
to great effect.  The eighteenth century historian Edward Gibbon, for instance, used notes 
extensively in his classic History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, about which 
footnote historian (yes, there exists at least one) Anthony Grafton has written: "[N]othing in 
that work did more than its footnotes to amuse his friends or enrage his enemies."15  And 
the late, great David Foster Wallace used notes in his fiction to—as he explained in a 
priceless television interview with Charlie Rose—break out of the linearity of the text and 
mirror the fractured nature of reality in his work.16 
 At the time I was starting to think about what I might write and talk about at this 
symposium, I was thinking about footnotes quite a bit as they related to my own work.  I 
had written a book in which I used footnotes extensively, mostly for comic effect and in 
large part to pay homage to Wallace, but my editors were very wary of them and kept urging 
me to cut them out or at least cut them down, claiming over and over that they would look 
"lame sitting there at the bottom of the page."  I was forced to articulate why I wanted to 
keep the footnotes in, which may have convinced the editors to let me keep a few of them, 
although in the end I would say probably 2/3 ended up getting cut.   
 All this thinking about footnotes led me to decide to write a short piece on Justice 
Ginsburg's footnotes, which is what this piece is.  I was curious about how often she used 
                                                 
15 ANTHONY GRAFTON, THE FOOTNOTE: A CURIOUS HISTORY 1 (1997). 
16 Interview of David Foster Wallace by Charlie Rose, http://www.charlierose.com/view/clip/9540 (last 
viewed January 9, 2009) (discussing the endnotes in Infinite Jest). 
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them and why.  I also thought that perhaps I could spark a new field of study in the legal 
academy.  Goodness knows there are enough footnotes in the legal documents out there to 
keep researchers busy for decades.  This may seem a bit far-fetched, and of course it is, but 
at least some study of footnotes is, I think, worthwhile.  As the aforementioned footnote 
historian has argued, although "the production of footnotes sometimes resembles less the 
skilled work of a professional carrying out a precise function to a higher end than the 
offhand production and disposal of waste products," nonetheless, "[h]istorians . . . cannot 
afford to ignore waste products and their disposal.  The exploration of toilets and sewers has 
proved endlessly rewarding to historians of population, city planning, and smells."   
 So, anyway, there's that. 
  
 My original plan when preparing to write this paper had been to read, study, and 
analyze every single footnote ever written by Justice Ginsburg as a Supreme Court Justice.  I 
had this idea that I would come up with a complicated functional taxonomy of Supreme 
Court footnote usage and categorize Justice Ginsburg's footnotes according to this 
taxonomy and report my findings here, complete with charts and tables and data regression 
analysis and fancy multi-colored pie-shaped-diagrams.  I asked my research assistant to 
prepare a chart with every footnote from every case, along with the case citation and year 
and the sentence from the opinion that went along with the footnote, along with a brief 
notation of what he thought the footnote's purpose was in the opinion.  This was last 
summer.  Throughout the fall I looked forward eagerly to tackling this ambitious project 
sometime after the leaves fell from the trees. 
 Well, it turns out that what I ended up doing was somewhat more modest than I had 
planned.  The biggest problem with fulfilling my original vision was that the chart that my 
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terrific research assistant Mark put together ended up being something like two million pages 
long.  Justice Ginsburg, it turns out, has written a lot of footnotes.  I don't know exactly how 
many, but extrapolating from the number of notes that I did end up looking at, it's probably 
somewhere in the area of 1,500.  I quickly decided to limit the study.  Instead of reading and 
analyzing all of Justice Ginsburg's footnotes, I decided instead to look only at the notes she 
wrote during three terms of her tenure at the Court: one of her first, her last, and one 
somewhere in the middle.  I figured this would give me a good enough idea of the different 
ways that Justice Ginsburg has utilized footnotes over the course of her career.  I would also 
be able to see roughly if her use of footnotes—how many, how she uses them—has changed 
over time.    
 Of course, limiting my study in this way necessarily reduces somewhat the accuracy 
and value of my conclusions.  I don't think, however, that this matters much given the 
context.  For some studies—say those that have the potential to affect public policy in 
profound ways and could prove to be extremely controversial, like the ones purporting to 
link abortion and crime rates or greenhouse gas emissions to melting ice caps—an attention 
to detail and painstaking accuracy are essential.  For a study like this one, however, I figure I 
can probably get by with something short of these things.  This is also one of the reasons 
(the other one being that I don't really know how to use Excel) that I decided to forego the 
fancy charts and regression analysis (though if you read far enough, you will indeed find one 
table).  
 
 Coming up with even a fairly simple taxonomy of Supreme Court footnotage still 
required some work.  To prepare my study, I read all of the footnotes that Justice Ginsburg 
penned during the following terms: 1994-1995 (her second term on the bench); 2007-2008 
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(her most recent completed term); and 2000-2001 (roughly in the middle).  She wrote ninety-
five footnotes in the 2007-2008 term; about the same number in the 1994-1995 term; and 
only about sixty during the 2000-2001 term.  I read through the footnotes and played around 
with different ways to categorize them.  I created provisional taxonomies and then dispensed 
with them as they turned out to be inadequate.  In the end, I settled on a nine-category 
system that seemed to work pretty well.  I developed it while reading through the first term I 
was considering, and it turned out to then work perfectly well for the other two years, which 
gives me some confidence that it is a fairly adequate way of categorizing the notes.   
 I doubt that the categories I have come up with will be surprising to anyone familiar 
with reading judicial opinions.  Though it's not impossible for someone so inclined to find a 
funny bit or two here and there,17 Justice Ginsburg does not generally use her footnotes in a 
Christopher Buckley-Chuck Klosterman18 "ha ha" manner.  Furthermore, very few, if any, of 
her notes echo Wallace's attempt to break out of the linearity of the text and mirror the 
fractured nature of reality through her judicial opinions.19  Instead, the nine different types of 
footnotes I was able to identify in Justice Ginsburg's work are those that (1) cite authority or 
quote directly from a source; (2) provide further detail about the case history of the case under 
review; (3) describe the position of lower courts on some issue; (4) explain why the Court is 
taking some action; (5) indicate that the Court will not take a position on or will not decide some 
question or issue; (6) mention or explain a point of law established by the Court; (7) provide 
additional background information about the case; (8) respond to an argument advanced by a party 
                                                 
17 There's one footnote where the Justice brings up Dickens' Bleak House to make a point; this one made me 
smile.  See Hess v. Port Authority, 513 U.S. 30, 49 n. 19 ("The dissent questions whether the driving concern of 
the Eleventh Amendment is the protection of state treasuries, emphasizing that the Amendment covers 'any 
suit in law or equity.'  Post, at 410.  The suggestion that suits in equity do not drain money as frightfully as 
actions at law, however, is belied by the paradigm case.  See Jarndyce and Jarndyce (Charles Dickens, Bleak 
House (1852))." 
18 See generally CHRISTOPHER BUCKLEY, LITTLE GREEN MEN (1997); CHUCK KLOSTERMAN, FARGO ROCK CITY 
(2000). 
19 See text accompanying note __, supra. 
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in the case; and (9) reply to a point made by another Justice in some other opinion in the case.  
In what follows, I say a little more about each of these categories and offer an example or 
two for each. 
  
 Some of the categories are fairly obvious.  The first category, for instance, includes 
those notes where the Justice simply cites a source for the proposition in the text or quotes 
something directly that she has referred to in the text.20  The second category of notes—
those that provide case history—include those that explain what the parties or lower courts or 
agencies did in the particular litigation giving rise to the case at the Supreme Court.  I also 
included in this second category notes regarding the positions taken by the parties in front of 
the Court itself, though arguably these could have been peeled off into a separate category.  
Thus, for example, I included here a note from the Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw 
Nation21—a 1995 case in which an Indian tribe challenged the state's taxation of income 
earned on tribal lands by tribal members living off of those lands—where Justice Ginsburg 
wrote: "The Tribe's claim, as presented in this case, is a narrow one.  The Tribe does not 
assert here its authority to tax the income of these tribal members."22  Other examples within 
this category are more straightforward—notes about the arguments raised by the parties in 
the lower courts,23 the sentences handed out by trial judges,24 or where to find the report of 
the Special Master in a case involving the Court's original jurisdiction,25 for instance.  A third, 
and somewhat related category, include those notes where the Justice characterizes the 
positions taken on an issue by the courts of appeals.  These fairly uncommon notes are usually 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 431 n.7 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)); Hess, 513 
U.S., at 44 n. 15 (citing New Jersey and New York statutes). 
21 515 U.S. 450 (1995). 
22 Id. at 464,  n. 13. 
23 New York Times v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 489 n. 1 (2001). 
24 Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 46 n. 2 (2001). 
25 New Jersey v. Delaware, 128 S.Ct. 1410, 1413 n. 4 (2008). 
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found in majority opinions where Justice Ginsburg is explaining that the Court took the case 
to resolve a split in the lower courts.26 
 Two of the categories concern actions the Court has decided to take in the particular 
case under review.  Category number four, then, includes footnotes where Justice Ginsburg 
self-referentially explains why the Court is taking some action or using some language the way 
it is.  So, for example, in a case from the 2007-2008 term, the Justice describes why using the 
term "privity" in a particular context would be confusing, and then explains that "[t]o ward 
off confusion, we avoid using the term 'privity' in this opinion."27  Elsewhere, the Justice 
uses a footnote to explain why a particular lawyer was arguing the case—pointing out that 
the Court had appointed a lawyer to argue the case for a pro se defendant who had filed a 
motion for appointment of counsel.28  I should probably note that by using the term 
"explains" to describe this category of footnotes, I am not including those notes in which the 
Justice further explains the basis or rationale of the opinion itself but instead just trying to 
capture the notes in which she explains why something surprising is happening, generally 
something procedural or linguistic.  Category five, for its part, might be described as a subset 
of category four, though important enough in its own right to justify a separate category—
namely, those notes where the Justice explains that the Court will not take a position on some 
issue for whatever reason.  Thus in one case, Justice Ginsburg explains that the Court will 
not reach an issue urged upon it by one of the parties,29 while elsewhere she mentions that, 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 2163 n. 3 (2008) ("We granted certiorari . . . to resolve the 
disagreement among the Circuits over the permissibility and scope of preclusion based on 'virtual 
representation'"). 
27 Id. at 2165 n. 8. 
28 Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39, 43 n. 3 (1995). 
29 Tasani, 533 U.S. at 498 n.8. 
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like the lower courts in the case, the Supreme Court will also not decide whether a city's 
zoning law violates the anti-discrimination provisions of the Federal Housing Authority.30 
 Two of the most important and prevalent categories—category #6: point of law; and 
category #7: background—can be easily confused and therefore justify being treated together.  
I define as a "point of law" footnote one in which the Justice explains the law of the 
Supreme Court on a point related to the case at hand; a "background" footnote, on the other 
hand, refers to a note that provides additional information about the factual context of the 
case or the legal context, to the extent that the legal context is set by a source of law other 
than the Supreme Court itself (like a state court or state statute or federal regulation).  So, for 
example, I count as "point of law" footnotes those that indicate "[a]n appellee or respondent 
may defend the judgment below on a ground not earlier aired [citing Supreme Court 
authority]";31 explain why a previous Supreme Court decision had severed part of a statute 
that was relevant to the opinion at hand;32 and quote John Marshall to elucidate the original 
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment.33  I count as "background" footnotes, however, those 
that explain a federal rule of appellate procedure;34 illustrate which baseball teams might owe 
what amounts of social security tax using hypothetical figures;35 or discuss the reasons 
behind why Congress might have passed some law.36  These categories importantly say 
nothing about the function of any of these footnotes—why the Justice might have used 
them—but are instead drawn simply on the content of the notes.  A more sophisticated 
functional account of the Justices' footnotes will have to wait for further study. 
                                                 
30 City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 730 n. 3 (1995). 
31 Greenlaw v. U.S., 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2567 n. 5 (2008). 
32 Kimbrough v. US., 128 SCT 558, 570 n. 12 (2007). 
33 Hess, 513 U.S., at 39 n. 9. 
34 Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 762 n. 2 (2001). 
35 US v. Cleveland Indians Baseball, 532 U.S. 200, 206 n. 9 (2001). 
36 Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 47 n. 4 (1995). 
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 The final two categories of footnotes, then, are ones in which the Justice reacts to 
somebody else.  The less prevalent of the two categories is #8, where Justice Ginsburg 
explicitly responds to an argument raised by one of the parties, as she did in the Court's most 
recently completed term—for example, in New Jersey v. Delaware, where she "f[ou]nd 
unconvincing New Jersey's contention that its officials were ignorant of the State's own 
statutes,"37 and in Preston v. Ferrer, where she refused to "take up Ferrer's invitation to 
overrule" a case contrary to his position.38  More prevalent and interesting is category #9, 
where the Justice—like in the opera-based footnote skirmish that I began with—responds to 
the argument of another Justice.  Over the three terms studied, Justice Ginsburg replied to 
another Justice almost twice as often as she responded to a party.  Though she certainly 
never shies away from answering the arguments of other Justices, Justice Ginsburg's replies 
are always civil and respectful; one finds in her opinions no invectives or linguistic versions 
of jumping up and down or stomping her feet as we occasionally see from some other 
members of the Court.  On the contrary, Justice Ginsburg might suggest only that the 
dissent's argument is "hardly an answer"39 to some point, or that the dissent has employed 
"curious reasoning,"40 or raised something "not relevant."41 
 These, then, are the nine categories of Justice Ginsburg's footnotes.  The following 
chart summarizes the number of times she used each type of footnote per term that I 
studied, as well as the percentage of all notes in any given term that fell into each category.  
I'm not sure if anything in the chart can be said to be particularly fascinating.  I do think it's 
somewhat interesting that in each term, footnotes used to provide background information 
                                                 
37 New Jersey, 128 S.Ct., at 1426 n. 20. 
38 Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 983 n. 2 (2008). 
39 Gutierrez de Martinez, 515 U.S., at 431 n.6 
40 City of Edmonds, 514 U.S., at 737 n. 11. 
41 U.S. v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531 n. 2 (1995). 
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were by far the most prevalent.  In two of the three terms, case history footnotes made up 
the second largest group of notes, while citations and quotations were also fairly numerous 
in two of the three terms.  As to trends over time, perhaps the most interesting result of the 
study relates to the relative prevalence of the Justice's responses to the other Justices as 
opposed to the parties.  With respect to percentages, category #9 (Reply to Justice) rose each 
term, from 10% in 1994-1995 to 11% in 2000-2001 to 15% in 2007-2008, while category #8 
(Respond to Party) fell from 7% in 1994-1995 to 4% in 2007-2008 (though with a result of 
11% in between).  Perhaps this reflects a greater comfort level over time with responding to 
other members of the bench and a feeling of lesser need to respond to arguments made by 
the parties themselves, although the result could also certainly be explained by factors having 
nothing at all to do with this rationale (I told you the results wouldn't be precise).   
 13
Justice Ginsburg's Footnotes by Type and Year 
 
Type of Footnote 1994-1995 2000-2001 2007-2008 
Cite/Quote 15 (16%) 12 (20%) 6 (6%) 
Case History 18 (19%) 8 (13%) 18 (18%) 
Lower Courts 4 (4%) 0 (0%) 3 (3%) 
Explain 2 (2%) 1 (2%) 5 (5%) 
No Position 2 (2%) 7 (11%) 5 (5%) 
Point of Law 14 (15%) 3 (5%) 16 (16%) 
Background 24 (25%) 16 (26%) 27 (27%) 
Respond to Party 7 (7%) 7 (11%) 4 (4%) 
Reply to Justice 10 (10%) 7 (11%) 15 (15%) 
TOTAL 96 61 99 
   
 
 The final thing I did in connection with this first-ever I-think-study-of-Justice-
Ginsburg's-footnotes is to review the notes she wrote in the cases during the 1998-1999 
term that I happened to work on.  There were twenty-two of them, and apart perhaps from 
the footnote that cited the fifteenth edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica for the 
proposition that "the photocopy machine was not yet on the scene" in 1949, they were all 
pretty standard stuff.42  About a third of the notes provided background information; 
                                                 
42 Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 353 n. 5 (1999).  The question in the case 
was when the thirty-day period for removal of a case from state to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) 
begins running; is it the day that the defendant is served, or might it begin running earlier, upon receipt of a 
faxed "courtesy copy" of the complaint?  Fascinating stuff, this.  In pointing out that the 1949 Congress that 
passed the relevant statutory amendment could not have had the situation posed by the case in mind, Justice 
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another third or so related case history.  There were four citation/quotation notes, a couple 
of responses to the parties (one actually to an amicus, which perhaps suggests broadening 
category #8 slightly), and two replies to other Justices.  I suppose that I was in a unique 
position that year to somehow convince the Justice to throw in a footnote that would have 
highlighted the fractured nature of reality, but probably such a suggestion would have simply 
earned me a pink slip.  That's OK, though, because I still have the memory of the opera 
footnote skirmish.  I assure you: It is not one I will soon forget. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ginsburg observed in the footnote that there were no fax machines in 1949.  The point about the photocopy 
machine appears to be simply an additional piece of background information to provide further context 
regarding the history of print-related technology. 
